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The indictment charges that the defendants participated
in the crimes charged in Counts I, II, III and V of the
indictment through the instrumentality of Farben and
otherwise. The charge, therefore, fairly comprehends acts
performed by defendants in their capacity as individuals and
seeks, in addition, to charge them with criminal responsibility
for the sum total of the alleged criminal activities said to have
been engaged in by the instrumentality, I. G. Farben. In
determining the responsibility of each defendant, if any, a
wide variety of circumstances running the whole gamut of the
evidence must be considered.
To require the defendants to go forward with their
proof on the counts of the indictment now under attack, it is
not necessary that each of evidence should establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt but merely that the sum total of the
evidence must establish in the mind of the trier of the facts
that there is guilt beyond reasonable doubt after consideration
of all the evidence.
Defendants held high positions in the financial,
industrial and economic life of Germany as these terms are
used in Control Council Law No. 10. This is not conclusive as
to guilt but is certainly a highly relevant factor to take into
consideration. I so interpret Control Council Law No. 10.
Nineteen of the defendants (all except Duerrfeld,
Gattineau, von der Heyde and Kugler) were members of the
Vorstand of Farben - the managing Board of Directors.
Krauch became chairman of the Aufsichstrat of Farben in
1940 after the death of Bosch. The Vorstand was responsible
for the direction of Farben under German corporate law. It
was a policy making body responsible for the farreaching
activities of Farben during a period of activity army n N}-one expert witness has

characterized as comparable only to the magnitude of the rearmament
of the United States after Pear(l) Harbor. We must say again that
criminal responsibility does not automatically attatch to membership
in the Vorstand even assuming the criminality of Farben's actions as a
corporate enterprise. On the otherhand one may not achieve immunity
from criminal responsibility for acts which he (^directs^), counsils
(els), aids, orders, or abets through employing the corporate entity as
cloak. Even a corporation (^constituting a chemical empire^) as large
as the I. G. Farben does not function in a vacuum in some strange
mystical which means in essence that as it is everybody's business it
is nobody's business. Society can not tolerate such a large area of
irresponsibity (evan) as a matter ot(f) international (^or municipal^)
law. When applied to the international crimes with which this
Tribunal is (^now^) dealing (concerned,) irresponsibility predicated
upon the theory or corporate acts for which individuals are not
responsible (^,) becomes a legal luxury which the society of nations
can ill afford. Some one was responsible for what Farben did. If
members of the responsible (its managing) board of directors (^or
Vorstand^) are not to be held responsible (^in some measure^) under
the circumstances of this case the(n) (a) perfect blueprint has been
provided for future aggressors. They may well understand (^In the
important work of arming for aggressive war^) immunity may be
achieved (^merely by^) creating confusion as (to) degress (degrees)
of participation and knowledge by spreading activities though the
ramifications of a huge corporation which must (may) achieve the
objective of arming for (^aggressive^) war without (^entailing any^)
responsibility (^there of^). They must merely follow the blueprint
of(^This is essentially what is urged when the defendants claimed
that^) "de-centralized centralization" (^meant that the Vorstand is
blameless as a matter of law.^) I cannot accept the thesis (view) that
membership in the Vorstand of Farben was (^such^) an empty honor,
(^devoid of real responsibility^) for which huge salaries were paid to
persons (members) who attended (^brief^) meetings (^which
generally adjourned for^) largely designed as social gatherings (^so
that the members were^) without knowledge of what was being done
in other parts of the organization. I cannot (Neither can I) accept the
view that these

were all "technical meetings" participated in solely out of a
passion for science and imbued with a pervading and
benevolent interest (for) betterment of humand-kind. The
outcome of these meetings was production of materials
designed to prevent countless millions from enjoying such
benefits.(^To our sorrow^) This is recorded now in the pages of
history.
But I would not apply a blanket rule of responsibility to
membership in the Vorstand. The same rule of liability of
corporate officers under Anglo-American law with its
reasonable limitations should be adapted for application to the
facts of this case and to the acts of these defendants. It is
commonly understood that a corporate officer is criminally
liable when he is actual, present and efficient actor behind the
corporate act which is criminal. On the otherhand, the officer is
generally held not liable unless he participates in the unlawful
act either directly or as an aider, abettor or accessory. The
Control Council Law which we must apply would add those
who take a consenting part in the commission of the crime as
wit in the requisite sphere of criminal complicity. We have
pointed out that the crime against peace requires participation
with guilty knowledge. Here again, I would apply this
principle:
"The general rule is that were the crime charged
involves guilty knowledge or criminal intent, it is
essential to the criminal liability of an officer of the
corporation that he actually and personally do the acts
which constitute the offense, or that they be done by his
direction or permission."
I would not hold any defendant liable for criminal acts
performed by Farben or by other officers or agents of the
corporation unless the acts were done with his knowledge and
under the authority of the accused. See discussion Fletcher,
Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol:. 3 (1931 Rev. Ed), §.1349.

Matters of a criminal nature reported to the Vorstand of
Farben and in this manner brought to the knowledge of its
members under circumstances implying assent and authority from
its membership to proceed with the criminal act can make a
member of the Vorstand responsible. A dissenting member would
not be responsible if his position was made known. But the record
is barren of any such dissent from any of these defendants who
were members of the Vorstand. They clearly took a consenting
part in many of the criminal acts which Farben and other agents
and officers of the corporation carried out.
For example: (Give many examples from the record) Not
only does the record establish participation in the intial
formulation of policies of Farben but subsequent consent,
approval and ratification are shown by numerous reports as to
which no dissent was expressed.
*****
The magnitude of the preparations in which the defendants
were engaged make it difficult to believe that they did not know
these preparations were for war; for aggressive war because they
knew that the policy of the German Government was one of
aggression backed by the threat of force. The defendants all take
the position that the evidence does not show that they knew there
would be war. What the IMT said with reference to Raeder seems
a complete answer to this position:
"The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor
von Fitisch, nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler
actually meant war, a conviction which the defendant
Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The
basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would
obtain a 'political solution' of Germany's problems. But all
that this means, when examined, is the belief that
Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's
armed might so overwhelming that the territory desired
could be obtained without fighting for it."
(IMT Judgment p.191)

*****
If the Charter and judgment of the International
Military Tribunal mean anything at all as a contribution to
international law they certainly mean that the community of
nations sanctions the effort through legal processes to get to
the basic problem of the evil inherent in launching (^and
waging aggressive^) war and to hold criminally responsible
all of those who' in a substantial way contributed to the
(^intention?^) planning and (or) preparation for the waging
of aggressive war and invasions of other countries. There is
no immunity to be found in the fact that the defendant is a
private citizen.
*****
The view that the law had not adequately developed
at the time of the acts for which the defnedants are sought
to be charged to apprise them of their guilt is merely a
restatement, in a different application, of the basis(c)
objection which has often been made that there was no law
for the offense of aggressive war. To say that the law in
inadequate as applied to these defendants in effect states
that there is no law for the offense as applied to them. But
there always has to be a first case and this Tribunal does not
have before it any (more) difficult a problem than that
which confronted the International Military Tribunal which
was intrusted with the task of first applying the concept of
aggressive war judicially to the conduct of individuals. Is
there any difference between the conduct of a military man
who, pursuing his profession, commits the crime against
peace pursuant to superior orders and at a time when the
nation is under compulsion and the position of the private
business man who similarly participates through the
production of materials without which the war could not be
waged? The ranking Field Marshal or

General who, being subject to military law in a nation at
war, is demonstrably under far greater compulsion to accept
the principle "my country right or wrong- but still my
country". A much wider range of action is open to the
private citizen and particularly is this true in those fields of
armament production in which exceptional technological
skill and initiative are to be required. If the military man
refuses to fight because in his opinion the war is an unjust
or aggressive war for which his country is criminally
responsible in the moral judgment of civilized nations, his
position off peril and the limited nature of the choice open
to him is much more apparent than in the case of the
chemical engineer who merely fails to exercise that unusual
degree of technical ingenuity which as a matter of history
was always exercised to such perfection in Germany as to
make them capable of waging a long and costly war wit.out resort to the raw materials formerly imported.
Conspiracy or common plan - it is not necessary to
find that there was a separate Farben conspiracy if there is
sufficient evidence to establish that there was participation
in the Hitler plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war.
Proof of this participation in such common plan or
conspiracy is present according to the statement in the IMT
when a defendant with knowledge of the aims of Hitler, lent
him their cooperation, they then became a party to the plans
which he had initiated. The elements insofar as the crime of
conspiracy are concerned are knowledge, participation in
the plan with intention to cooperate and support it. The
argument of the proseuction seems convincing on this
score. That there was an intent to cooperate with the plans
of the Nazi to wage aggressive war – not merely parallel
action here lacking the requisite criminal intent to
participate in the conspiracy.

*****
I cannot accept the conception that the war of
Germany against England and France was not a war of
aggression or a war in violation of in ernational treaties in
the sense in which those terms are used in the Charter and
in Control Council Law no. 10. It is ture that the
International Military Tribunal did not find it necessary to
characterize the nature of this war. But it is abhorent to any
sense of justice and would certainly not be in keeping with
the moral judgment of the civilized world to say that
Germany was not the guilty aggressor against England' and
France in the sense in which aggression must be understood
as a matter of common international law. Following
attempts to halt the Hitlerite aggression even to the degree
of appeasement reflected in the Munich agreement, a
courageous coalition of France and England courageously
but firmly, after all urging and pleading had failed,
officially advise Hitler that an aggressive act against Poland
means war, with England and France because of solemn
pacts and treaty obligations under which those countries are
bound to come to the aid of Poland. Such action was
courageously done with almost certain knowledge that if
there was war in the air the superiority of the Luftwaffe
would mean almost certain destruction of the cities of
England and France as their armies took the field in the
attempt to apply needed sanctions to the aggressor. It is not
the initial act of declaring war which determines the
aggressive character of the war and it is of little moment
that England and France first declared war upon Hitler.
Whether we say that the aggression against Poland was
aggression against England and France who were the allies
of Poland compelled to take the field if treaty obligations
were to be respected, or whether we say that a

way against the policing army which takes the field to apply
sanctions to the aggressor is part and parcel of the initiation
aggressive war, the answer is the same. Essentially there is
no difference. The action of France and England was
justified before the moral judgment of the world.

January 12, 1948
We will have to determine the extent of the individual
participation of each defendant, based upon his individual action, in all
of the activities related to the planning, preparation and waging of
aggressive wars and, in that connection, consideration will be given to
acts done in their personal, individual, or official capacity not performed
in their capacity as officials or employees of the Farben enterprises. In
addition it will be necessary to consider the extent of the participation of
the alleged instrumentality Farben, in the such activities and then to
asses the degree of individual responsibility, if any, for the actions of
Farben, the instrumentality, and the subsidiaries of Farben. Some of the
defendants acted personally and completely outside of the frame-work of
Farben, while others acted solely in their capacities as officials and
employees. Basically this involves these questions:
What is the responsibility of a member of the Vorstand of Farben
who knew that a gigantic rearmament program was being carried out by
the business enterprise of which he was a responsible director - who
knew that such rearmament program was being directed by the State
which was then actively engaged in an aggressive foreign policy of
territorial aggandizement based primarily upon a threat of employing
force if necessary for the achievement of the objectives of that foreign
policy. Upon to a certain period of time, even if the defendants are to be
charged with the common knowledge then prevailing in Germany, it
cannot be said that up to that point of time rhere was ever any common
knowledge of the intention of Hitler and the Nazi party to wage a war of
aggression. Certainly the Munich pact was widely heralded as the end of
the territorial demands of Hitler and created widespread hope as
Chamberlain had optimisticaly expressed it that the policy of
appeasement would result in the purchase of peace in our time. It cannot
be denied that there was considerable fear in Germany that the policies
of Hitler would lead to war. That he would become so saturated with the
successes without necessity of launching a war that he would intensify
his excessive demands and would overstep the limits of toleration of
such policy which up to then had been suffered, albeit not without
protest, by the community of nations, dedicated as they were to the high
humaritarian purpose of averting the catastrophy of a second world war.
The extent to which the civilized nations of the world were willing to go
in this regard is well illustrated by the appeals made to Hitler by the
President of the United States and the Vatican on the eve of the invasion
of Poland

and in a last minute effort to prevail upon Hiteler to agree to mediation of
his demands, thereby avoiding the horrors which have now been written
with blood in the pages of history.
Can it be said that these defendants had knowledge of Hitler's plans
to wage an aggressive war in the absence of direct and positive proof of
such knowledge brought home to either through participation on one of the
important secret conferences at which he announced his aggressive
intentions or through other credible proof that report of the decisions was
brought home to them in some other way by persons having direct and
intimate knowledge of such plans and intentions. It has been argued that this
question may be answered in the affirmative and that a case for the requisite
criminal knowledge to ,establish one of the essential elements of criminal
guilt is to be found in a series of interences which may be legitimately
drawn and applied to the activities of the defendants in this case. This
amounts to piling inference upon inference and while such deductions from
the chain of facts does constitute conclusions that are decidedly more in the
realm of probability than in the realm of mere possibility; while the Tribunal
is inclined to believe that the defendants, or some of them, may have known
of the plans to aggressive war - yet notwithstanding this inclination on the
part of the Tribunal, we cannot conclude from the evidence before us that
the fact of knowledge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance
with the standard of proof above mentioned. It is ture that the defendants
occupied high positions in the industrial life of Germany and in that capacity
they had much intimate knowledge which was withheld from the general
public. They knew, for example, that their plans were engaged day by day in
production of many materials, chemical products which could be used only
for the waging of war. They knew that furthermore than they were engaged
in the production of synthetic raw materials without which Germany could
not wage war on a scale which could not possibly have been in keeping with
not alone the peace time needs of Germany. They knew or were charged
with knowledge that facility expansion for the production of these materials
was far in excess of any possible peace-time estimates of the needs of
Germany. They knew that secret stand-by plants for war production were
being erected by them under agreements with the Reich and various
agencies of the Wermacht. But all that this amounts to is an intimate
knowledge of the extent of the secret rearmament of Germany unless we are
prepared to say that rearmament with knowledge that such gigantic efforts
are involved creates the necessary inference that they knew of the plans to
wage aggressive wars, the case against the defendants must fall on the
charge of planning and preparing a war of aggression.

While factual distinctions may be drawn between the activities of Schacht
who was acquitted by the International Military Tribunal and the sustained
activities of the Farben defendants – the pronouncement by that Tribunal
that "rearmament does not constitute a crime under the Charter" cannot be
overlooked or easily explained away. It is perhaps a deplorable state of
affairs to be forced to recognize that gigantic rearmament activities carried
out by a group of men who were willing to do business with Hitler and
who, at every stage of the hideous Nazi program, raised no voice of
protest, but went along willingly in that program does not constitute a
crime against peace. But the answer to that problem is one which has often
been given before by courts of justice applying principles of law which
this tribunal is bound to uphold. There can be no publishment for action
unless the action denounced constitutes a crime. Here one of the essential
elements of the crime of planning and preparing for a war I of aggression
is lacking, that is the guilty knowledge. The principles of international law
reflected in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal have indeed
by legislative enactment and by recognition of principles of common
international law after the development of the Anglo-American common
law - progressed to the point at which the planning or preparation of a war
of aggression is a crime against international law for which there is
individual penal responsibility, but it cannot be now asserted that
international law has developed to the point at which rearmament of itself
was recognized as a crime against international law unless that rearmament
is part and parcel of a plan to wage aggressive war known to the parties
participating in the rearmament. It is fervently to be hoped that in the not
too distant future the dangerous potentialities of action of the character of
which these defendants were engaged will be recognized to the point of
developing some means among the community of nations to deal with the
problem of rearmament in violation of international treaties, a crime of
itself without the necessity. Perhaps action of this character should be
made without exact knowledge of the intended use of the armaments so
produced.despite the difficulty of harmonizing any such rule of law with
rearmament legitimately conceived for defensive purposes. We might draw
an analogy. Suppose that Mr. Truman should be advised that war with the
Soviet Union is inevitable and he and a high circle of advisors determine
that they will pursue a policy based upon the threat of force even to the
application to force to obtain certain demands from Russia.
The intention to use force to the point of war is not publicly announced,
but the demands of the Government of the United States are made public
and immediately there is widespread fear that the

policy so announced means that war with Russia is inevitable.
There is immediate intensification of the rearmament plans of the
United States. Measures for economic mobilization for war are
initiated; production of armament is pushed with all of the
initiative and ingenuity which is characteristic of American free
enterprise; Americans gird themselves and get ready for come
what may. The last demand of the United States is rejected and the
President and the Congress of the United States declare war on
Russia under circumstances which make it inescapable that the war
is a war of aggression. Can it be said that the officials of the
Dupont Company are liable for participating in the planning and
preparation of a war of aggression if they knew nothing more than
the common knowledge above referred to? Can it be-said that the
Oak Ridge scientist who, with knowledge of the possibility that
war was imminent, feverishly and with great initiative, rushes to
completion the current modification of his atomic bomb, even
more terrible than the first, is guilty of initiating a war of
aggression, or participating in the planning and preparation for
such a war? In judging facts in retrospect we must soundly
consider the application of such facts to other times and other
circumstances which cannot be readily distinguishable on
principle. Unless rearmament with knowledge of the possibility
that an aggressive war is imminent, constitutes a crimes, the
defendants cannot be convicted for participation in the common
plan of aggression or of initiating, planning, and preparing a war of
aggression, in violation of treaties, etc.
It is no doubt considerations such as these which prompted
the IMT to require, as a condition precedent to criminal complicity
in the common plan that there be some detailed and intimate
knowledge of specific plans to wage a war of aggression. The
proseuction correctly states that it is not essential that the date and
the hour be known - but the fact that a war of aggression is to be
launched must be known to constitute the requisite guilty
knowledge.

The judgment of the International Military Tribunal is not
an isolated judicial opinion intended to stand still as the ultimate
expression of the customary international law which now
recognized aggressive war as a crime. Nor is the Charter or the
London Agreement upon which the jurisdiction of that Tribunal
was founded a codification expressing maximum development
in the law of nations as of that time. These great landmarks in
the development of international law should be viewed merely
as a "premise for legal reasoning". In the well chosen words of
the disginguished American lawyer and statesman Henry L.
Stimson we should regard the law of Nuremberg, as expressed
in the IMT judgment "xx for what it is, -a great new case in the
book of international law." There is no reason to deny to that
case the vitality as a source for the generation of law which has
been traditionally accorded to the judicial opinion or the case in
the common law. The genuis of the common law for
development is indeed now transferred to the field of
international law. If it be agreed (contended) that such a
conception of the law of international crimes is abhorrent to the
sense of justice in that action is being made criminal by ex post
facto judicial declaration, or that control Council Law No. 10 is
ex post facto legislation, it would be a sufficient answer merely
to say that no act is being treated as a crime which was not
criminal at the time it was committed. The fallacies in the ex
post fact argument have been exposed in the judgment of the
IMT. However, because this fallacious argument is the one most
commonly levelled at judicial proceedings seeking to apply the
concept of crimes against peace – these additional observations
are made on the subject.

What did these defendants know? They knew they
were rebuilding German military might on a scale
theretofore unknown in the history of the world; they knew
that the materials they were synthesizing were part and
parcel of a master plan of military economy; they knew that
their contribution to theWehrmacht and the production of
the plants they were planning and building were essential to
the waging of war; they knew that, from the very nature of
the products being produced and planned that some of them
had their only possible use as munitions and materials of
war; they knew that those products which did have a peacetime use were being planned on such a vast scale and with
such disregard of normal economic factors operating in a
peace-time economy as to be consistent only with the
objective of war; they knew they were participating in
violating the Treaty of Versailles; they knew that, at certain
definite periods, closely related to political events in which
the German policy of aggression backed by threats of force
was being actively pushed, they were being asked to
intensify their activities to keep pace with the possible
results of these policies and world-shaking events; - they
knew that they were doing all of these things in a war-like
atmosphere and for leaders who had made their war-like
intentions manifest on many, many occasions.
It taxes credulity to say that they did not know they
were taking a consenting part in the preparation of
Germany to implement its policy of aggression by war if
necessary.
When they now say that they did not know or believe
that war would result, they merely assert main as Raeder
did before the IMT, that they believed that

the military might which they were building would lead to
further Munichs and that the objectives of territorial
expansion would be achieved by threats of force without
the necessity of actually employing it.
But it is not necessary to rely upon the inference of
knowledge established from the nature and scope of their
activities and from the positions which they held placing
them in peculiarly advantageous situation to acquire
knowledge. The record establishes that knowledge of plans
for aggressive war in which they were participating was
brought home to them in more direct fashion on a number
of occasions. For example, etc.

